Abstract-Changes to safety critical systems are inevitable and can impact the safety confidence about a system as their effects can refute articulated claims about safety or challenge the supporting evidence on which this confidence relies. In order to maintain the safety confidence under changes, system developers need to re-analyse and re-verify the system to generate new valid items of evidence. Identifying the effects of a particular change is a crucial step in any change management process as it enables system developers to estimate the required maintenance effort and reduce the cost by avoiding wider analyses and verification than strictly necessary. This paper presents a sensitivity analysisbased technique which aims at measuring the ability of a system to contain a change (i.e., robustness) without the need to make a major re-design. The proposed technique exploits the safety margins in the budgeted failure probabilities of events in a probabilistic fault-tree analysis to compensate for unaccounted deficits or changes due to maintenance. The technique utilises safety contracts to provide prescriptive data for what is needed to be revisited and verified to maintain system safety when changes happen. We demonstrate the technique on an aircraft wheel braking system.
I. INTRODUCTION
System safety is a major property that should be adequately assured during the development process, the deployment and the operation life of safety critical systems. System safety is not assured by chance but rather it must be engineered and evaluated in a systematic manner that might be mandated by safety standards, best practices and experts' recommendations. Hence, safety critical systems are often subject to a compulsory or advisory certification process which often necessitates building the systems in compliance with domain-specific safety standards.
Following the standards' prescriptions leads system developers to generate a lot of artefacts during and after the development of their systems. These artefacts are used as safety evidence to prove that the standards obligations and recommendations were carried out. However, if the generated artefacts are not demonstrated and explained properly, there will be less certainty about their importance which may lead the overall confidence being undermined. Therefore, developers of some safety critical systems construct a safety case (also known as "assurance case") to demonstrate the safety aspect of a system by identifying all potential risks and describing, in the light of the available evidence, how these risks have been eliminated or duly mitigated.
Typically, safety critical systems are evolutionary and they are always exposed to both predicted and unpredicted changes during the different stages in their lifecycle. Changes to a system can negatively affect the gained confidence because these changes have the potential to compromise the safety evidence which has been already collected. More clearly, evidence after a change might no longer support the developers' claims because it reflects old development artefacts or old assumptions about operation or the operating environment. In addition, the cost of obtaining certification is significant, with estimates such as 30% of lifecycle costs [5] and 25-75% of development costs [20] are spent on certification [3] . Hence, improper handling of system changes in the safety cases can reflect untrue safety status of the systems and it can also waste significant amount of the certification cost.
Despite clear recommendations to adequately maintain and review the systems and their safety cases by safety standards, existing standards offer little or no advice on how such operations can be carried out [21] . Hence, there is an increasing need for globally acceptable methods and techniques to enable easier change accommodation in safety critical systems without incurring disproportionate cost compared to the size of the change. However, since broader re-verification and revalidation require more effort and time, it is important for any proposal that aims at facilitating system changes to localise the impact of the changes. More specifically, to alleviate the cost of updating both a system and its safety case due to a change, it is crucial to minimise the effects of that change and prevent these effects from propagating into other parts of the system as far as it is practically possible.
In our previous work [12], we introduced a Sensitivity ANalysis for Enabling Safety Argument Maintenance (SANE-SAM) technique that supports system engineers to accommodate some types of potential changes. We also developed SANESAM+ [9] as a modified version of SANESAM that covers wider variety of changes. The key principle of SANESAM and SANESAM+ is to determine the flexibility (or robustness) of a system to changes using sensitivity analysis. The output is a ranked list of Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) events that system engineers can refine. The result after the refinement is a list of contracts. Also the contract notation in Figure 3 -b is used to annotate the contracted events. Each contract considers multiple assumptions options based on the number of the children events. Figure 5 shows the derived contracts using the contract notations in grey. Figure 7 provides an internal view of the Contr LOOBS1 contract which is derived for the event LOOBS1 as an example.
Step 3. Associate the derived contracts with the safety argument: In this example, we use a GSN argument fragment to show the association. Figure 6 shows how the derived safety contracts from FTA are associated with a safety argument fragment for WBS using the proposed contract notation in Figure 3 -a. We do not want to affect the way GSN is being produced but we want to bring additional information for developers' attention. It is worth mentioning that a safety contract should be associated with all claims that are related to the event which the contract is derived for. For example, the safety contract Contr SWFSTS2PAS2F should be associated with any articulated claims about the state when Switch Failed Stuck to System 2 Position and System 2 Fails. Now, let us assume some change scenarios that can resemble real life change requests.
Change request scenario (1): The WBS developers have received a change request from the senior management asking to replace the current installed power supplies in BSCU 1 and 2 by a different model. Based on the provided product specifications by the new power supplies manufacturer, the FP of that model is 3.00E-04, which means that it is less reliable than the FP of the current model in use (i.e., 6.75E-05). Subsequently, step 4 should be followed to assess the impact of the given change scenario.
Step 4. Check the ability of FTA to contain greater FP(s) than those already exist: As a quick check, we want to update the FPs of the affected events based on the new given FPs and calculate the new FP of the top event. The new FP of the top event after the replacement is 1.646E-06 and since 1.646E-06 < 3.3E-05, the increments to the FPs of BSS1PSF and BSS2PSF are tolerated (i.e., containable) in the FTA but the question is: Where can they be contained?
To answer this question we need to specify the affected contracts by the change and check whether or not they still hold in the light of the new FP. The change request will affect four contracts, namely, Contr LOOBS1, Contr LOOBS2, Contr LOOBS1 D and Contr LOOBS2 D. Each derived contract contains different options in the assumptions list (as shown in Figure 7 ). We choose (Option 1.) in the four contracts and check if the MAFPs of BSS1PSF or BSS2PSF can contain the new FP. Since 3.16E-04 (MAFP) > 3. , the increments to BSS1PSF and BSS2PSF are contained in the four contracts and they still hold. This implies that replacing the power supply is rated as a GREEN change which means (according to Table I ) that there is no need to make any structural changes to the system design nor the safety argument. However, a manual check for the argument is still needed to replace the information of the old power supply with new valid information. For example, the description which the context CxtPSDesc refers to (in Figure 6) is out of date and should be replaced by the new power supply description.
Step 5. Re-balance the FPs of the FTA's events as a preparation for future changes: The reduction in the margins of the BSS1PSF and BSS2PSF FPs should be shared by all of the events in the FTA. That is, all current FPs should contribute to make up the contraction of BSS1PSF and BSS2PSF FP margins due to the power supply replacement, as follows: 1) Find ΔF P (T opevent) which is the difference between the required F P (i.e., 3.30E-05) and the new F P Current(T opevent) after containing the change which we have determined earlier (i.e., 1.646E-06).
Step 1-ii (i.e., the SANESAM+ approach which we have already mentioned under Step 1 in this Subsection) to distribute 3.136E-05 over all FPs' margins in the FTA. The grey squashed rectangles in Figure 5 represent the new MAFPs after the change.
Step 6. Update the affected safety contracts: Since new MAFPs have been calculated for all of the events, all derived contracts should be updated to reflect the new MAFP values.
Change request scenario (2): This scenario is similar to scenario (1). The only difference though is the FP value of the new power supply model, which is in this case equals to 5.00E-03 and thus it has less reliability than the current FP and even lesser than the one from the first scenario. As a quick check, the FP of the top event after introducing the change is 2.8106E-05, which means that it is < F P Required (T opevent) and thus the change is tolerable. By applying the same steps we did in the previous scenario we will find out that Contr BSS1&2DNO is the contract which contains the change.
Change request scenario (3): This scenario is similar to the previously discussed scenarios (2) and (3). The difference here is that the FP value of the new power supply model is 6.00E-03, which means that it has less reliability than the current FP and it is the least reliable in this the three scenarios. The new calculated FP for the top event of this scenario is 3.9432E-05 and it is > 3.3E-05 (the MAFP for the top event). That is, the resultant change effects due to replacing the power supply by this specific model is not containable and the entire FTA is going to be impacted. Hence, the WBS cannot meet its current safety requirements without considering major structural changes or updates. Figure 8 shows a high level view of the change effects in the FTA that is caused by replacing the power supply in the three discussed change scenarios. The figure also shows how the safety contracts are used to highlight the affected parts in the WBS design and the safety argument. More
